In this dissertation, I argue that having an emotion is having a network of multiple
components-typically feelings, bodily changes, evaluations, and action tendencies. I
came to this conclusion as I attempted to locate my view of emotions in the ocean of
various theories of emotions.
In Chapter 1, I first make clear that I set aside all theories that attempt to single
out the essential element of emotion and define emotion in terms of the single element. I
will call these theories 'Singular-Essential-Component Theories of Emotion' (or the SEC
theories for short). I found the SEC theories not promising because none of the elements
that the SEC theories identify emotions with can fully capture the crucial features of
emotions. Therefore, a proper kind of emotion theory should employ multiple elements to
explain emotion. I will call this kind of theories, 'Multiple-Essential-Component Theories
of Emotion (or MEC theories for short)'.
Once accepting that multiple elements mutually explain emotion, we face a series
of follow-up questions - exactly what and how many elements should be included in
emotion theory? Specifically, what is the relationship among those elements? Is there any
particular sequence in appearance of those elements in emotion? Do any elements rely on
any other elements, or are all elements independent from each other? Chapter 2, 3, 4, and
5 deal with these questions and various MEC theories will help to navigate the answers to
these questions.
In Chapter 2, I claim that all elements that the SEC theories mention as the
defining element of emotion, namely, feelings, bodily changes, evaluations, and action
tendencies are equally crucial for emotions. However, it is not that they conjointly
constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for emotion. The prototype of an
emotion is a process that involves the four elements.
Chapter 3 elucidates a point that I make in claiming that all four elements are
equally crucial for emotions. That is, the claim that characteristic bodily changes alone
can define emotions is wrong. I argue in this chapter that the popular belief that basic
emotions have unique bodily signs is not well-supported. I also reject the view that
higher-cognitive emotions that are known to lack characteristic bodily changes are not
genuine emotions.
In Chapter 4, I reject that there is a fixed order among the four elements of
emotions; elements can come in any order. The interactions between elements are multidirectional
and circular, rather than linear. The multiple elements attract each other and
form a network.
In Chapter 5, I point out that none of the four elements of emotions are
independent from each other. They are all distinguished elements - no element can be
reduced to other elements, but they are not independent - they keep influencing each
other in making and develop emotions. I also stress that feelings have a somewhat
different status than other elements in that only feelings require the presence of at least
one of other three elements and only feelings reflect the changes of other elements in
their structure.
