The five papers that follow are set in the context of the problem of, or argument from, evil. I
have chosen to discuss, in that context, three topics that are of special interest to me in the
hope that what I have to say about them may make a useful contribution to literature on the
subject. The topics discussed are, first, the inductive evidential version of the argument from
evil considered in light of the subjectivity of human experience; second, the question of
attributing blame to God for causing or allowing human suffering; and, third, God's
knowledge of the human condition of suffering.
The topic discussed in paper one is the inductive version of the evidential argument from evil,
considered in light of the subjectivity of human experiences. I argue that when the latter is
taken into account, not only does the evidential problem of evil have less force than might be
expected, it also becomes impossible to formulate it in a straightforward way that would be
understood and/or accepted by everyone engaged with the problem.
Paper two is concerned with James F. Ross' argument for the illegitimacy of blaming God for
the existence of evil even though God has, or shares, responsibility for it. Ross' contention is
that once the relation between God and the created world is understood, it will be clear that
God is isolated from, rather than the deserver of, blame. The argument offers a neat and
rather ingenious response to those who contend that evil threatens God's perfect goodness.
There can be no such threat, argues Ross. Viewed sympathetically, I try to fill in some of the
gaps Ross leaves open in an attempt to see how far the argument may be defended against
objections. In the end, however, I give reasons why the theist should not accept it.
