This book explores the idea that we have two minds - one that is automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to dual processs theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within the former, processes are held to be innate and to use heuristics which evolved to solve specific adaptive problems. In the latter, processes are taken to be learned, flexible, and responsive to rational norms.

Despite the attention these theories are attracting, there is still poor communication between dual-process theorists themselves, and the substantial bodies of work on dual processes in cognitive psychology and social psychology remain isolated from each other. This book brings together leading researchers on dual-processes to summarize the state of the art, highlight key issues, present different perspectives, explore implications, and provide a stimulus to further work.

It includes new ideas about the human mind both by contemporary philosophers interested in broad theoretical questions about mental architecture and by psychologists specialising in traditionally distinct and isolated fields. For all those in the cognitive sciences, this is a book that will advance dual-process theorizing, promote interdisciplinary communication, and encourage further applications of dual-process approaches.

About the Author:
Jonathan Evans has conducted a major research programme on thinking and reasoning since the 1970's. His publications include seven authored books and well over 150 scientific papers. His research includes study of cognitive biases in reasoning and judgement, and of the psychology of conditionals. He is one of the founders of the dual-process theory of reasoning and in recent years has extended this interest to broadly based dual-system theories of the mind. Keith Frankish is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at The Open University. His research spans debates about the nature of belief, the structure of the mind, and consciousness. His publications include two authored books, three co-edited volumes, and numerous journal articles and book chapters. His 2004 book Mind and Supermind argued that a dual-systems perspective is implicit in everyday belief-desire psychology and explored the implications of this view for issues in philosophy of mind.