Objectivism about moral obligation is the view that an agent's moral obligations do not depend
on her beliefs or her evidence. The three leading theories in normative ethics (viz.,
consequentialism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics) have all traditionally been formulated as
versions of objectivism. (For example, the traditional formulation of consequentialism requires
agents to maximize value, not to do what they believe maximizes value or to do what their
evidence suggests maximizes value.) In my dissertation, I argue that if we pay closer attention
to how we use the phrase "moral obligation" and reflect more carefully on the nature of
obligation more generally, we will find ourselves with good reasons to reject objectivism.
Furthermore, I contend that our reasons for rejecting objectivism also speak against
prospectivism, the view that an agent's moral obligations depend on her evidence, and in favor
of subjectivism, the view that an agent's moral obligations depend on her beliefs. Finally, I argue
that none of the most common objections to subjectivism are successful. Thus, we have most
reason to be subjectivists about moral obligation.
