Talents play a central role in the way that we live our lives, and it is widely
assumed that identifying and developing one's talents is valuable, both for oneself
and for others. Despite this, the philosophical literature is seriously lacking in its
discussion of the nature and value of talent; the objective goodness of talent and
its development is often assumed without an analysis of what a talent is, and the
value that we place on it. This dissertation aims to provide such an analysis,
offering a philosophical account of the nature and value of talent, and an account
of why we value its development. In doing so, I demonstrate how this can inform
and help us assess the debates and arguments that are made in the existing
philosophical literature on talent. I do not aim to provide an exhaustive overview
of all the philosophical issues that could be raised in relation to the value of talent
and talent development, but instead I focus on three central issues that arise when
analysing the nature of talents and the role that they play in our lives.
The first issue is the nature of talent itself. Here I offer an account of
talent, understood as a high level of potential for a particular skill which is
expressed and manifested in the excellent acquisition of that skill. The second
issue is whether or not we have good prudential reasons or a moral obligation to
develop our talents. I begin by objecting to Kant's claim that there is a moral duty
to develop one's talents; I will argue that if there is such a duty, it will not be
generated by the commitments of Kant's moral theory. I then argue that whether
or not talent development is morally required, or prudentially good, is conditional
on one's endorsement of the commitments that are required to bring about the
development of one's talent.
