My dissertation analyzes the overlooked character types of akrasia (un-self-control) and enkrateia
(self-control) in Aristotle's ethics. In Chapter 1, I argue that akrasia and enkrateia are character
types, or settled psychological dispositions, definable in terms of unique un-self-controlled and
self-controlled relations to choice-making. In Chapters 2 and 3, I contend that agents do not express
these character types only in temperance's practical domain; rather, agents can express akrasia
and enkrateia in any practical domain where one's reason can conflict with one's desire. More
specifically, in Chapter 2, I develop a distinction between strict forms of the character types, which
agents express in temperance's practical domain, and loose forms of the character types, which
agents express in other practical domains (e.g., in courage's practical domain). In Chapter 3, I draw
two lines of psychological justification for the view that akrasia and enkrateia are wide-ranging
character types and respond to some scholarly objections. In Chapter 4, I build an account of ethical
practical syllogisms and differentiate them from non-ethical practical syllogisms; I argue that an
agent expresses her character type through each feature of an ethical practical syllogism (i.e., not
only through the enacted choice that concludes her ethical practical syllogism, but also through
the propositions she exercises in it). Finally, in Chapter 5, I construct and analyze loose akratic
and enkratic practical syllogisms in a variety of practical domains to show that akrasia and
enkrateia are character types with wide ranges of expression.
